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Abstract: This paper addresses a basic security requirement of electronic voting, namely 
that a voter can correct or abort his vote at any time prior to his final vote casting. This 
requirement serves as a protection against voter precipitance (haste). We specify rules for a 
reset and cancel function that implement the correction and abort requirement. These rules 
are integrated in an extended version of the formal IT security model provided in [VG08]. 
We show that these rules do respect the requirements covered in this model namely that 
each voter can cast a vote, that no voter loses his voting right without having cast a vote 
and that only eligible voters can cast a vote. This paper formally describes and 
mathematically proves the model and finally shows at which places of a voting process the 
formal rules apply. 
                                                          
17 This paper is developed within the project “ModIWA – Modellierung von Internetwahlen” which is funded 
by DFG, and carried out at the Universities Kassel (Roßnagel, Richter) and Koblenz-Landau (Grimm, Hupf) 
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1  Introduction 
Security is an elementary property of electronic voting systems and is thus fundamental 
for the trust of the voters in the system. Security objectives for electronic voting were 
first collected in an informal way, for example by a European-wide accepted 
recommendation adopted by the Council of Europe [CE04]. Later the semi-formal 
method of the Common Criteria [CC06] was used to specify a Protection Profile (PP) for 
a basic set of security requirements for online voting products [VV08]. There are good 
reasons to specify the security objectives of an IT system in a formal way, i.e., by 
mathematical calculus which states and proves properties clearly [Wa05]. The 
formalization of security objectives is a way to gain unambiguous and clearly understood 
Requirements for electronic voting. Due to its formal base, it can be mathematically 
proven that a specification or implementation conforms to these formal security 
requirements. For example, the mandatory access model of Bell and LaPadula [BP73] 
strengthens the trust in a secure centrally controlled multi-user computer system, such 
that in the early days of computer system security evaluation it used to define the highest 
assurance level of the Orange Book Criteria [DD85]. Thus a formal IT security model on 
electronic voting defining security requirements from [CE04] and [VV08] in a formal 
language can create large amounts of trust in the effect of the security functions 
implemented in the electronic voting system. 
However, the Common Criteria Protection Profile for online voting products [VV08] 
requires an evaluation according to evaluation assurance level EAL2+ on a scale from 1 
to 7. This level does not require any formal proof. This evaluation level seems to be 
acceptable as this PP only claims to define basic requirements. Parliamentary elections, 
however, demand a higher evaluation level, probably EAL 6 or 7. At this level, the 
application of formal methods and the definition of a formal security model [CC06] are 
mandatory for the Common Criteria evaluation. 
To enable a Common Criteria evaluation according to these levels, the authors of 
[VG08] provide an IT security sub-model for electronic voting. However, this model 
only covers a small subset of security objectives namely that each voter can cast a vote, 
that no voter loses his voting right without having cast a vote and that only eligible 
voters can cast a vote. This model needs to be extended to meet the remaining security 
objectives. The aim of this paper is to extend the protection against errors by haste 
(precipitation). Moreover, in extending the model in [VG08] we have found a weakness 
in the model which is corrected in this paper, as well. 
Protection against errors by haste is a basic legal requirement well established in private 
and public law [Ba06]. This requirement is expressed by two security objectives in 
[VV08], “O.Correction” and “O.Abort,” as well as by the security objectives 10 and 11 
in [CE04]. To meet these two security objectives, we will propose two functions “reset” 
and “cancel” of a voting process. The abortion of a voting process protects not only 
against precipitation, but it also protects the secrecy of voting against unwanted external 
events like the appearance of another person during the voting process. Thus reset and 
cancel are important for the support of the freedom of vote. 
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The paper is organized as follows: In the subsequent section 2 we quote those security 
objectives, from the Protection Profile on basic requirements for online voting products 
[VV08], that we are going to formalize in this paper. In section 3 we enhance the 
existing formal IT security model in [VG08] according to our findings and provide a full 
proof of its correctness. In section 4 we formalize the “reset” and “cancel” functions, 
which have been introduced in section 2. In section 5 we prove that this extended 
security model is correct and, thus, provides a smooth extension of the original security 
model [VG08]. To complete the picture, in section 6 we show (informally) at which 
points in a voting process our security rules of the formal model are applied. Finally, in 
section 7 we draw some conclusions from our work and point to further research. 
2  Security Objectives 
Security models start with the identification of security objectives [CC06, Gr08]. In the 
protection profile of a basic set of security requirements for online voting [VV08], a set 
of thirty-two security objectives for online voting products are specified. The following 
two of these have been used as a first step towards a formal model for remote electronic 
voting systems in [VG08]18:  
O.OneVoterOneVote: It is ensured that (a) each voter can cast one vote and (b) no 
voter loses his voting right without having cast a vote. 
O.UnauthVoter: Only eligible voters who are unmistakably identified and authenticated 
are allowed to cast a vote that is stored in the ballot box. 
These two objectives are met by specifying properties that define “secure system states” 
and rules to be applied on any function that securely transfers a system state into another 
system state. Therefore, these rules are called transition rules. After specifying the 
related security state properties and transition rules of these two security objectives, we 
will extend the model by including two more security objectives from [VV08], namely: 
O.Abort: The voter can abort his voting process at any time prior to the final casting of 
the vote without loosing his right to vote. 
O.Correction: There is no limit on the number of corrections a voter can make to his 
vote until the final casting of the vote. 
These objectives will not be met by security properties, but by a further transition rule. 
We propose that “reset” and “cancel” functions are the appropriate prototype functions 
of this rule, whereby “cancel” will be a repetition of “reset” until the initial state of a 
voter’s voting process. We will prove (in section 5) that these rules preserve the security 
properties of O.OneVoterOneVote and O.UnauthVoter. 
                                                          
18 We refer to [VV08] as well. This paper formally models some basic security requirements for electronic 
voting, which apply to both voting machines and online voting. 
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The rules for allowed state transitions are to be implemented by voting products as 
functions for data processing. However, the rules do not determine appropriate places for 
these functions within a voting process. Strictly speaking, it is not the purpose of an IT 
security model to design processes or protocols. Although we are not going to design the 
voting process, we will show (in section 6) informally at which points in a voting 
process our rules (and especially the “reset” and “cancel” functions) would be applied. 
3  The Basic Model 
3.1  The original model of [VG08] 
We quote the basic model from [VG08] in that we take the security objectives 
O.OneVoterOneVote and O.UnauthVoter and associate them with properties of a 
secure state and allowed state transitions. Before we define the security properties, we 
define (general) system states of a voting process: 
Definition 1 (voting system state) 
A system state S := <W, V, voter> is represented by a triple of the following three 
entries: 
1. W – Set of eligible voters (those who are listed in the electoral register and 
have not yet cast a vote). 
2. V – Set of (encrypted) votes stored in the e-ballot box. 
3. voter: V  M – Mapping of (encrypted) votes to their electors. 
Wtotal is the set of all eligible voters registered by the responsible voting officials before 
the voting system is started. M is a superset of Wtotal that contains any user who tries to 
access the remote electronic voting system, whether or not this particular user has the 
right to cast a vote. The function voter assigns each (encrypted) vote to its producer 
(voter). 
The initial state is defined as the triple S0 := < Wtotal, V0={}, voter0={}>. 
We assume that state transitions t1, t2 … that carry the system from state to state are 
stimulated by events such as the login of a voter into the system, the request of an empty 
voting ballot, the filling out of the ballot, the casting of a vote, etc.  
  i
ttt SSS i ...21 10  
Now we follow the basic model in [VG08] and proceed to defining secure system states, 
and then we state the rules for allowed state transitions.  
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Definition 2 (secure voting system state, basic version) 
A state Si is a secure state iff (all of) the following constraints hold: 
totali
iitotal
i
WvvoterVvrUnauthVote
wvvoterVvWWwBeVoteOneVoterOn
vvvvotervvoterVvvAeVoteOneVoterOn



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Definition 3 (rules for permitted state transitions) 
A state transition from state Si to state Si+1 stimulated by event ti+1 is permitted,  11   iti SSpermitted i , if one of the following rules holds: 
  [Rule 1]  Wi = Wi+1  Vi = Vi+1  voteri = voteri+1 
  [Rule 2]  vVi+1 : (voteri+1(v)Wi  Wi+1 = Wi \{voteri+1(v)}  Vi = Vi+1\{v} ) 
[Rule 1] represents a state transition in which no vote is cast whereas [Rule 2] models a 
state transition during which an eligible voter casts a vote into the ballot box. This voter 
is eliminated from the list of eligible voters and his vote is stored in the ballot box. 
3.2  Discussion of the original model 
The security theorem in [VG08] proves that “for all permitted state transitions starting 
with the initial state [...] holds that any reachable state is secure.” This security theorem 
is correctly proven. But it doesn't regard those secure states that are reached by an illegal 
state transition. Any state reachable by a permitted state transition from a secure state is 
obliged to be secure, even if the initial state (which is secure) has been reached for any 
reason by a non-permitted state transition. The following example shows that this isn't 
fulfilled for the formal security model in [VG08]:  
Assume an eligible voter casts a vote into the ballot box, but –due to erroneous 
system implementation– the voter isn't eliminated from the list of eligible voters. 
The succeeding system state remains secure because OneVoterOneVote(B) 
doesn’t specify properties of Wi, but only of Wtotal\Wi. Suppose this voter casts a 
vote again. Since this voter is still eligible, his vote is stored in the ballot box 
and he is eliminated from the list of eligible voters. This represents a permitted 
state transition according to [Rule 2]. But the ballot box now contains two votes 
from the same voter. Thus an insecure system state is reached from a secure 
state by a permitted state transition.  
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To avoid this situation the definition of secure states needs to be extended such that a 
voter who has cast a vote into the ballot box is removed from the list of eligible voters. 
This can be incorporated into the formal model of [VG08] by extending definition 2 by 
an additional requirement for secure states:  
  wvvoterVvWwCeVoteOneVoterOn ii  )(::)(  
Still, this extension isn't sufficient yet. Let Si be a secure state. Furthermore, assume that 
an eligible voter x who hasn't yet cast a vote wants to vote. Let the system be in a state 
where the voter’s eligibility is provable, i.e., xWi. Due to an incomplete or incorrect list 
of registered voters, let xWtotal. This situation and x Wi\Wtotal are not forbidden by the 
definition of a secure state. Therefore, the system would follow [Rule 2] and let x cast a 
vote v, such that Vi+1= Vi {v} holds. Even though state Si was secure and the state 
transition from Si to Si+1 was permitted, state Si+1 isn't secure since x=voter(v)Wtotal 
violates the security property UnauthVote.  
To avoid this situation, we add one more requirement for secure states, namely, that the 
system allows only registered voters (xWtotal) to cast a vote (xWi): 
  totali WWtersEligibleVo   
This leads our enhanced security model’s definition of a secure state. 
 
3.3  The enhanced model 
We now include the additional security properties OneVoterOneVote (C) and 
EligibleVoters from our discussion in section 3.2 above to the three security properties 
OneVoterOneVote (A and B) and UnauthVoter from definition 2 in section 3.1 above and 
thus we get the final definition of a secure state by these five security properties: 
Definition 4 (secure voting system state, advanced version) 
A voting system state Si is a secure state if (all of) the following constraints hold:  
totali
totali
ii
iitotal
i
WvvoterVvrUnauthVote
WWtersEligibleVo
wvvoterVvWwCeVoteOneVoterOn
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vvvvotervvoterVvvAeVoteOneVoterOn
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Obviously, the five properties above are equivalent to the two following properties: 
(ap.1) voter is an injective function (equivalent to OneVoterOneVote (A)), 
(ap.2) Wtotal=Wi+voter(Vi) (“direct sum”, equivalent to the other four properties). The 
direct sum means that both hold, Wivoter(Vi)=Wtotal, and Wivoter(Vi)=. 
The proof that (ap.1) and (ap.2) are equivalent to definition 4 is straight forward and left 
as an exercise to the reader. It is also easy to see that the initial state S0 is secure, because 
the voter function is empty, and hence injective; and W0voter(V0)=Wtotal=Wtotal ; 
and W0voter(V0)= Wtotal=. 
 
Security Theorem 
Permitted state transitions of definition 3 carry secure states into secure states according 
to definition 4. 
 
Proof: In [VG08] we proved the security theorem in the weaker version that starting 
with S0 any sequence of allowed state transitions would always lead to a secure state. We 
had to prove this by mathematical induction. Here we prove a stronger version that 
starting from any secure state (regardless of how this state was reached) an allowed state 
transition according to [Rule 1] or [Rule 2] will always reach a secure state. That is, we 
have to prove directly: For any i ≥0, if we assume that Si is secure, i.e., it has properties 
(ap.1) and (ap.2), and that  11   iti SSpermitted i , i.e., ti+1 follows [Rule 1] or [Rule 2], 
then we have to show that properties (ap.1) and (ap.2) also hold for Si+1. 
Let ti+1 follow [Rule 1]. Then Vi+1= Vi and Wi+1= Wi and voteri+1= voteri, thus Si+1 simply 
inherits the security properties (ap.1) and (ap.2) from Si. 
Let ti+1 follow [Rule 2]. Then exactly one eligible voter casts a vote v into the ballot box 
during state transition ti+1. Thus, Wi+1= Wi\{voter i+1(v)} and Vi+1= Vi{v} holds. 
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(ap.1) Then voteri+1 is injective on Vi{v}, because voteri+1 restricted on Vi is, by 
definition, equal to voteri, which is injective, and voteri+1(v) does not match with any 
other image of voteri, because voteri+1(v)Wi\ Wi+1 Wi and hence cannot have been in 
voteri(Vi) since Wivoter(Vi)=. 
(ap.2)  (i) Wi+1voter(Vi+1) = (Wi\{voter(v)})  voter(Vi{v}) =  
  (Wi\{voter(v)})  (voter(Vi){voter(v)}) = Wi voter(Vi) = Wtotal .  
  The last equality holds because Si has property (ap.2). 
 (ii) Wi+1voter(Vi+1) = (Wi\{voter(v)})  voter(Vi{v}) =  
  (Wi\{voter(v)})  (voter(Vi){voter(v)}) = Wi voter(Vi) = .  
  The last equality holds because Si has property (ap.2). 
4  An additional transition rule for “reset” and “cancel” 
In this section we incorporate the security objectives O.Abort and O.Correction into the 
enhanced formal model. For this purpose we introduce an additional transition rule 
[Rule 3], which meets these objectives and will, therefore, be associated with a secure 
“reset” and “cancel” function. 
4.1  Informal description of “reset” and “cancel” 
While O.Abort is correlated with the sending and receiving of “cancel,” O.Correction is 
associated with the sending and receiving of “reset.” With “reset” we mean that during a 
voting process a voter can go back one step just before the last message that he sent to 
the server. With “cancel” we mean, that a voter can repeat reset events back to the initial 
state so that he can restart his individual voting process. On the receiving side, after a 
voter’s “reset” the voting server must filter out all events that were stimulated by 
messages exchanged with this voter just before the last message received from this voter. 
However, all other events stimulated by messages with other voters must be kept by the 
voting server. On receiving a “cancel” message from a voter, the voting server must 
forget all events by messages exchanged with this voter, but keep all events stimulated 
by other voters. The sending and receiving of a “reset” and “cancel” message must be 
carefully synchronized between voters and their voting server. As a security rule, the 
“reset” must not create or delete voting rights or cast votes 
4.2  Formal basics 
The formalization of the “reset” and “cancel” functions requires some formal basics on 
lists and list operations and a communication function on events. Readers who are 
familiar with the formal specifications can skip to section 4.3. 
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Let M denote the set of all communication partners. Then we assume communication 
partners a, b, …M who observe events that are correlated by a communication 
function com. Partner a will be a model for a voter and partner b will be a model for a 
voting server. Each partner observes events on his side that are stimulated by the sending 
and receiving of messages. Events are communicated via messages. If a sends a message 
of type e to b, then a observes the event of type e that he sends to b, and b would observe 
this event with the label e as a message of type e that he receives from a. In the 
following we will use the terms “message” and “message type” with the same meaning 
as “event” and “event label”, respectively. We will sometimes say, “sending event” and 
“receiving event” instead of “sent message” or “received message.” The following event 
labels (=message types) are useful for the modeling of electronic voting, e.g., [VV08]. 
Note that they are just an example which we will take up in section 6. They are not 
exhaustive. For example, message types “error” or “verify” are ignored throughout this 
paper’s model. 
Eventlabels   =  {login, requestBallot, vote, reset, cancel, 
     confirmBallot, castVote, feedback, logout} 
Let eEventlabels then sig(e) denotes the algebraic sign of e. A negative sign of an 
event label e indicates that the associated event is being sent, e.g., e = –login. A positive 
sign indicates the associated event is being received, for example, e = confirmBallot. 
Events are event labels associated with their sender and recipient. We denote the set of 
all possible events as 
  MMsEventlabelEvents   
Let a,bM and eEventlabels. Events are defined as triples, but for convenience we 
will use the following notation for events instead (cf. [Gr09]): 
   a(e:b)  a receives a message e from b 
   a(–e:b) a sends a message e to b 
 
Let for 1≤ k≤n πk denote the set-theoretic projection of a Cartesian product of n sets on 
its k-th component. Let x = a(  e:b) be an event and πi the projection of a tuple to its i-th 
element, then 
π1(x) returns the event label e of x, which may carry a positive or negative sign. 
 π2(x) returns aM. Note that a is the sender of the message e if sig(e) is positive, and 
a is the recipient if sig(e) is negative. 
 π3(x) returns bM. Note that b is the recipient of the message e if sig(e) is positive, 
and b is the sender if sig(e) is negative. 
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For the synchronization of events that are stimulated by messages between a and b, we 
need a way to express that a message is observed by both sides. Let Events be the set of 
all possible events, a,bM and eEventlabels. The function com is defined as in [Gr09] 
and maps the sending and receiving of a message on the corresponding event on the 
partner's side: 
com: Events  Events 
com(a(e:b))  := b(–e:a) 
com(a(–e:b)) := b(e:a)  
We are going to collect events in ordered lists of events which allow us to operate on 
sequences of events and on identified events within the list. The algebra of ordered lists 
is a standard formalism used in theoretical computer science, see for example [MG08]. 
As usual, a list of events is understood as a finite sequence (or n-tupel) of these events. If 
op is a function on lists, for example the deletion of its head element, then the k-times 
repetition of the operation is denoted as ))...))((...(()( 11 LopopopLop kk
k
 . 
Useful list functions are [MG08]: 
 For any list L of elements of a set Q, set(L) Q denotes the (unordered) set that 
consists of all elements of L.  
 head(L) and tail(L) return the last element of L, and the rest of the list L without the 
last element, respectively. In contrast, tail is complementary to tail and returns the 
remaining list without the first element of L.  
 Let qQ, then L||q appends the element q at the end of the list L. 
 |L| returns the number of elements in L.  
 Assume nN a natural number and qQ. L[n] returns the element at the n-th 
position in the list and pos(L,q) returns the position of the last occurrence of the 
element q in the list L. 
 del(L,l) with lN a natural number returns the list L, from that the l-th and all 
succeeding elements are removed. 
 Especially for lists L of events, we define a filter function, a remove function and a 
select function. For an event x and k{1,2,3}, filterk(L,x) removes all events with 
event label x from the list L if k=1, or it removes all events whose first or second 
actor is x from the list L if k=2,3, and then returns the remaining list. For a 
communication partner a, rmv(L,a) returns the list L from which all events that 
were sent or received by a are removed. The function selectk(L,x) returns the list of 
events where only those events with the event label x are contained if k=1, or only 
those events whose first or second actor is x are contained if k=2,3.  
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4.3  Formalized “reset” and “cancel” 
We are now ready to formally define the “reset” and “cancel” event and prove the 
important synchronization theorem. For simplicity we assume in the following that a 
communicates solely with b, while b communicates with a and other partners as well. 
Thus in the model, a represents a voting client and b represents the voting server. 
Definition 5 (Reset) 
Let a,bM and Xi be the list of events on the side of communication partner a , i.e., 
axXx i  )(: 2 . Furthermore, let Yj denote the list of events on the side of 
communication partner b. Let sent(Xi) denote the list of events that contains the send-
events of Xi only, and let received(Yj) denote the list of events that contains the receive-
events of Yj only, then we define:          
  




)}((|max{,),(
))((
:):( 0
ini
i
i XsentsetxNnlwhereelselXdel
XsentsetifX
bresetaX        
  


elseaYfilter
CifaYtailrmvkYdelaresetbY
j
j
k
j
j ),(
)),((||),(:):(
3
2  
  where C2 is )))},(((|max{:0 3 aYfilterreceivedsetyNnkk jn   
Explanation: If a communication partner aM executes a “reset” then the last event 
xlXi which is sent by a and all successive events to xl are deleted. If there is no event in 
Xi that is sent by a (i.e., Xi is empty or contains only received events), then Xi is set to its 
initial state.  
If a communication partner bM receives a “reset” then the last event ykYj that is 
received by b from a is deleted as well as all successive events to yk, which are sent to or 
received from a by b. Remark that all events successive to yk, which are exchanged with 
other communication partners, are preserved in the state of communication partner b. If 
there is no event in Yj that is received from a by b (i.e., Yj is empty, doesn't contain any 
events exchanged with a or contains only events sent to a), then all messages sent by b to 
a are deleted from the list Yj, i.e., b is set to initial state with respect to a. All events that 
are exchanged with different communication partners are preserved. 
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General Assumptions: 
The reset and cancel functions are to be synchronized between voters and server. They 
wouldn’t work properly if the system is interrupted. Therefore, availability is a security 
requirement for all communication functions. For the purpose of our security 
considerations, we assume that our systems are available and work correctly. Therefore, 
we assume secure communication channels in the following sense: 
(A1) )()(:0)(:0 ji YsetxcomjXsetxi     
If a communication partner a exchanges a message x with b then there exists a 
state such that this message is observable on the partner's side. 
 
  (A2)  ),(),(:))((,:0 miniimn xXposxXposXsentsetxxi  
       ))(,())(,(: mjnj xcomYposxcomYposij     
If a communication partner a sends two messages in a particular order then the  
communication partner b receives them in exactly that order. 
 
 
Theorem (Synchronization property of “reset”) 
In a secure communication environment (i.e., A1, and A2 hold) the sending and 
receiving of “reset” events are well synchronized. Formally: com(head(sent(Xi ||a(-
reset:b)))) = head(received(select3(Yj|| b(reset:a),a))). 
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Proof: 
Given the two assumptions (A1) and (A2). Furthermore, we denote C1: set(sent(Xi))≠ , 
i.e., a hasn’t sent anything so far and C2: set(received(filter3(Yj,a)))≠ , i.e., b hasn’t 
received any message from a. According to definition 5 of “reset,” the following four 
possibilities exist: 
1. Neither C1 nor C2 holds. 
Then Xi ||a(-reset:b)=   and select3(Yj||b(reset:a)) = select3(filter3(Yj,a))=  . 
Obviously, Theorem 1 is true. 
2. C1 does not hold, but C2 holds. 
This directly contradicts assumption (A1). If there was no message sent by 
communication partner a, then there can't be any message received from a by b.  
3. C1 hold and C2 does not hold.  
This is a direct contradiction to assumption (A1) as well. If there was no 
message received by b from a, then there can't be any message sent from a to b. 
4. C1 and C2 hold. 
Let xl be the last event sent by a before executing reset. Due to premise (A2), 
head(received(select3(Yj,a)))=com(xl) holds. On the side of communication partner a, the 
event xl and all successive events to xl are eliminated during the execution of reset. On 
the side of communication partner b, the event com(xl) and all successive events to 
com(xl) that are exchanged with the communication partner a are eliminated during the 
execution of reset. All events successive to event xl that are exchanged with different 
communication partners are preserved.   
If set(sent(Xi ||a(-reset:b)))=   holds, then due to premise (A1) set(received(select3(Yj || 
b(reset:a),a)))=   holds as well. Thus Theorem 1 holds.  
Assume sent(Xi ||a(-reset:b))≠  and let xm=head(sent(Xi ||a(-reset:b)) be the last sent 
event after the execution of “reset.” Given precondition (A1) there exists a state on the 
partner's side such that com(xm)Yj || b(reset:a). Furthermore, in accordance to premise 
(A2) com(head(sent(Xi||a(-reset:b)))= head(received(select3(Yj||b(reset:a),a))) holds. 
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Definition 6 (“Cancel”) 
Let a,bM and Xi be the list of events on the side of communication partner a, i.e., 
axXx i  )(: 2 . And let Yj be the list of events on the side of communication 
partner b, respectively. Then we define: 
  0:):( XbcancelaX i   
  ),(:):( 3 aYfilteracancelbY jj   
Explanation: If a communication partner a executes a “cancel”, then he is set back to his 
initial state with an empty event list X0. If a communication partner b receives a “cancel” 
from communication partner a, then all events sent to or received from a by b are 
eliminated from his event list.  
 
Remark: 
According to definition 6 the following holds: Let k:= |sent(Xi)|+1 be one more than the 
number of all sending events in the list of events on the side of a, and let 
l:= |received(filter(Yj,a))|+1 be one more than all events that b has received from a, then  
  
0):(||):( XbresetaXbcancelaX
k
ii   
  ),():(||):( 3 aYfilteraresetbYacancelbY jljj   
The execution of “cancel” by a communication partner a can be expressed by means of 
the event “reset”. Communication partner a executes a(–reset:b) for each event sent by 
him, until there are no events left or only events that are received by a. By executing an 
additional a(–reset:b), a is set to its initial state with empty event list X0. 
The execution of “cancel” on the partner's side can be specified by the means of the 
event “reset” as well. Communication partner b receives b(reset:a) for each event 
received from a. The remaining events are all either sent from b to a or are messages 
exchanged with other communication partners different than a. The remaining events 
sent to a are deleted by the execution of an additional b(reset:a). 
In the next step we must make sure that “reset” cannot produce insecure states, i.e., we 
have to specify a transition rule for “reset”. 
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4.4  Transition rule for “reset” 
A state transition from state Si to state Si+1 stimulated by event ti+1=a(–reset:b) is 
permitted,  11   iti SSpermitted i , if the following rule holds: 
[Rule 3] Let Ti be the list of events observed by a before the execution of “reset,” 
and let Ti+1 be the list of events observed by a after the execution of reset, 
and let l := |Ti+1| be the length of list Ti+1. Furthermore, let T:= )( i
l
Ttail  be the 
list of reverted events. Then ti+1=a(–reset:b) is permitted iff 
  (aWiWi+1)  (1j|T|:  1][   jljTjl SSpermitted ) 
Explanation: According to [Rule 3], a state transition from state Si to state Si+1 stimulated 
by event ti+1 = a(-reset:b) is an allowed state transition if the voter is eligible and has not 
yet cast his vote, both, before and after, the execution of “reset” (aWiWi+1) and all 
reverted state transitions were permitted (  jljTjl SSpermitted   ][1 ).  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Relation between the list of events before and after the execution of “reset.” 
 
Remark: [Rule 3] is compatible with both rules, [Rule 1] and [Rule 2], because it resets 
only permitted transitions. [Rule 3] conforms to [Rule 1] because by the reverted state 
transitions no vote had been cast into the ballot box. [Rule 3] is compatible with [Rule 2] 
because the resetting voter would not be one of those voters who had cast votes into the 
ballot box. Due to the definition of the “reset” function (the filter function in definition 5 
makes sure that actions of other participants remain untouched!), the ballots of the other 
voters would not be reverted, of course. 
0 l l+jTi+1
Ti
T
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5  The extended model 
In this section, we show that [Rule 3] complies with the security properties (ap.1) and 
(ap.2) which are equivalent to definition 4. 
The specification of an IT security model requires first the specification of secure system 
states and of permitted state transitions [Gr08]. As a definition for secure system states, 
we use the definition 4 of section 3.3 above in the version with the two properties (ap.1) 
and (ap.2), namely that “voter is an injective function” (ap.1) and that 
“Wtotal=Wi+voter(Vi)” (ap.2). 
Extended security theorem 
Permitted state transitions according to [Rule 1] and [Rule 2] of definition 3 as well as 
according to [Rule 3] from section 4 carry secure states into secure states according to 
definition 4. Formally, if a state Si is secure and  11   iti SSpermitted i , then Si+1 is also 
a secure state. 
Proof of the security theorem: For [Rule 1] and [Rule 2] we have proven the security 
theorem already in section 3. We have only to prove the security theorem with respect to 
[Rule 3] of secure “resets.” To simplify the proof, we first prove the following lemma: 
Lemma 1: If a state Si is secure and  iti SSpermitted i1 , then Si-1 was a secure state. 
Proof of Lemma 1: If Si is a secure state and ti was a permitted state transition, then the 
state transition ti was performed according to [Rule 1] or by [Rule2]: 
[Rule 1]: Then Vi = Vi -1 and Wi = Wi-1 hold. Since Si is secure, Si-1 was secure as well. 
[Rule 2]: Then there exists exactly one vote v'' that has been put into the ballot box 
during state transition ti such that Vi-1 = Vi \{v''} and Wi-1= Wi {voter(v'')}. It has to be 
proven that the properties (ap.1) and (ap.2) hold for Si-1. 
(ap.1) Firstly, voter is injective on Vi-1 because Vi-1 = Vi \{v''} Vi, and voter is assumed 
to be injective on the full Vi already. 
(ap.2) Secondly, it must be shown that Wi-1+voter(Vi-1)=Wtotal: 
(i) Wi-1voter(Vi-1) = Wtotal holds because voter is injective, and therefore 
Wi-1voter(Vi-1) = Wi {voter(v'')}  voter(Vi\{v''}) = 
Wi{voter(v'')}  (voter(Vi)\{voter(v'')}) = Wivoter(Vi) = Wtotal. The last 
equality holds because Si is assumed to be secure. 
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(ii) Wi-1voter(Vi-1) =  is true because:  
Wi-1voter(Vi-1) = (Wi{voter(v'')})  voter(Vi\{v''}). Since Si is a secure state 
such that Wivoter(Vi)= holds, it is sufficient to prove that {voter(v'')}  
voter(Vi \{v''}) =  holds. And this is true because voter is injective. 
  
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
Given the Lemma 1 above, the proof of the security theorem with respect to [Rule 3] is 
trivial: If ti+1 follows [Rule 3] and Si was secure, then all reverted state transitions were 
permitted according to [Rule 3], and hence Si+1 is a secure state according to our Lemma 
1 above.                  
6  Transition rules in a voting process 
In the previous sections we have specified conditions for allowed state transitions. In this 
section we show, at which points in a voting process these rules are to be applied. There 
are several variants conceivable for each voter's polling process [VV08]. Since we are 
not going to discuss process designs, we have chosen one process variant with login at 
start of the voting process.  
 
Figure 6.1: Mapping of transition rules on a (simple version of a) voting process 
 
A sequence of transitions of the polling process is exemplarily shown in figure 6.1 where 
only the client side of the electronic voting process is considered. The voter identifies 
and authenticates himself by sending his data to the voting server (-login). If the voter is 
unmistakably identified and authenticated on the server’s side, the voter is able to 
request the ballot form (-requestBallot). The ballot form is displayed on the voter’s client 
and the voter makes his voting decision (-vote). The voter has to confirm his ballot (-
confirmBallot) to protect against errors by haste. Afterwards he casts a vote into the 
ballot box (-castVote), where the casting of the vote follows [Rule 2]. The voter is 
allowed to correct his vote (-reset) or abort (-cancel) his voting process any time prior to 
the final casting of the vote, where “reset” and “cancel” follow [Rule 1] and [Rule 3]. 
-confirmBallot X6 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5X0 
-requestBallot -vote -castVote -logout 
-cancel 
-cancel 
-cancel 
-cancel 
-reset -reset -reset -reset 
[Rule 1] 
-login 
[Rule 1] [Rule 1] [Rule 1] [Rule 1] [Rule 2] 
[Rule 1&3] [Rule 1&3] [Rule 1&3] [Rule 1&3] 
[Rule 1&3] 
[Rule 1&3] 
[Rule 1&3] 
[Rule 1&3] 
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Figure 6.2: Example of an illegal placing of “reset” in the voting process 
But the voter should not be allowed to correct or abort his vote after the final casting of 
his vote, as shown in figure 6.2. If he could do that, he would obtain the possibility to 
cast a vote into the ballot box for a second time. Note that our recommendation for the 
placement of “reset” and “cancel” complies with the security transition [Rule 3] which 
states that the voter is eligible, both, before and after the execution of “reset” and that all 
reverted state transitions were permitted. 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper an IT security model formalizes some basic security requirements for 
electronic voting: one voter one vote, eligible voters, the correction of a vote, and the 
abortion of a voting process. The corresponding security properties are specified as 
secure system states. The voting functions are controlled by state transition rules. We 
prove mathematically that a function following the rules would transfer a secure state 
into a secure state.  
This contribution demonstrates how security requirements for electronic voting can be 
formalized and how an existing IT security model can be extended by adding gradually 
security objectives. However, we have not yet included anonymity or verifiability in our 
model. For a complete formalization of the security requirements for electronic voting, 
the IT security model presented in this paper needs to be extended by the remaining 
security objectives defined in the Protection Profile [VV08] and [GH09] step-by-step. 
Our next research step is to incorporate voter anonymity. 
-confirmBallot
X6 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5X0 
-login -requestBallot -vote -castVote -logout 
-reset 
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